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ABSTRACT 
Purpose – Service networks are inherently complex as they comprise of many interrelated 
actors, often driven by divergent interests. This can result in imbalance, which refers to a 
situation where the interests of at least one actor in a network are not secured. Drawing on the 
“balanced centricity” perspective, this paper explores the causes of imbalance in complex 
service networks.  
Design/methodology/approach – Adopting a qualitative case-based approach, this paper 
examines a public health service network that experienced imbalance that was detrimental to 
the lives of its users: the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust, UK. Drawing on service-dominant 
logic and stakeholder theory, case evidence provides insight into the origin and drivers of 
imbalance in complex public service networks. 
Findings – The origin of imbalance stems from competing institutional logics of various 
actors (patients/public, employees, managers, regulatory bodies, etc.), but the degree to which 
these competing institutional logics lead to imbalance is moderated by accountability, 
communication, engagement, and responsiveness within the service network.  
Research limitations/implications – By uncovering causes of imbalance in complex public 
service networks, this paper pinpoints important research avenues for developing the 
balanced centricity perspective.  
Practical implications – The inherent existence of multiple parallel institutional 
arrangements makes networks imbalanced, but value creation can be achieved when the 
appropriate mechanisms are fostered to manage balance between divergent logics. 
Originality/value – By examining imbalance as the underlying cause of network 
dysfunction, this research contributes to understanding of the dynamics in, and performance 
of, complex public service networks.  
Keywords – Complex service systems, service networks, value co-creation, institutional 
logics, balanced centricity, public services, health services, stakeholder theory, service-
dominant logic, Mid-Staffordshire Trust, NHS. 
Paper type – Research paper. 
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What Causes Imbalance in Complex Service Networks?                                               
Evidence from Public Health Services 
Introduction 
In today’s specialized markets, the creation of value increasingly takes place in complex 
service networks that are composed of multiple actors whom contribute to creating value for 
themselves and for other actors through resource integration and service exchange (Patricio et 
al., 2011; Pinho et al., 2014; Vargo and Lusch, 2008). This means that value creation for the 
individual beneficiary is dependent on the interconnected resources and activities of a 
multitude of actors – persons and/or organizations – who work towards common goals 
(Jaakkola and Hakanen, 2013). Consequently, the responsibility for the quality of the 
outcome is spread across the network, which means that failure in one part of the network 
may result in destruction of the overall value in the network (Tax et al., 2011). A notable 
recent example of such network failure emerged at the Mid-Staffordshire National Health 
Service (NHS) Trust in the UK, where at one hospital an estimated 400 to 1200 patients died 
between January 2005 and March 2009 as a result of poor quality of care (Campbell, 2013). 
Though positioned within a healthcare system that by international standards is deemed 
effective when compared against international equivalents (Ingleby et al., 2012; see 
Appendix A), the events that occurred at the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust illustrates how the 
complexity of modern public healthcare service networks with many interrelated actors can 
cumulatively contribute to an unacceptable service (Holmes, 2013).  
While extant service reseach has explored how value is created and experienced in 
service networks (e.g., Pinho et al., 2014; Jaakkola and Hakanen, 2013), very few studies 
focus on service failure in a network setting (Tax et al., 2011). To shed light into why 
complex service networks such as the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust case may fail, it is 
critical to shift the perspective to a system-level, “many-to-many” perspective that takes 
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different actors in the network and their interconnectedness into consideration (Pinho et al., 
2014; Tax et al., 2013). Gummesson (2007, 2008) argues that each network actor is driven by 
their respective anticipation of value, by which a failure to take different aspirations into 
account may have negative repercussions for the creation of value in complex service 
networks. To highlight this viewpoint, Gummesson (2007, 2008) put forward the concept of 
“balanced centricity” that describes a situation where the interests of all actors in a network 
are secured. This view resonates with stakeholder theory that calls for “simultaneous 
attention to the legitimate interests of all appropriate stakeholders” (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995, p. 67), which is expected to bring long-term value outcomes to network actors 
(Hillebrand et al., 2015).  
To date, few researchers have investigated how complex service networks that include 
a wide variety of diverse actors, can strive for and/or reach balanced centricity. Notable 
exceptions include studies by Frow and Payne (2011), Quero and Ventura (2015), and 
Hillebrand et al. (2015) that provide preliminary insights into the importance of balance and 
ways to achieve this. While the insights garnered shed light on the drivers of balance, they do 
not explore why service network imbalance (i.e., the situation where legitimate interests of at 
least one actor in a complex service network are not secured) might occur in the first place. 
Since understanding value creation in complex networks is of pivotal practical and academic 
relevance in the increasingly systemic and fragmented service context, within public and 
private settings alike (e.g., Pinho et al., 2014; Ostrom et al., 2015), this research aims: to 
explore the origin and drivers of imbalance in complex service networks, thereby 
illuminating hindrances for value co-creation in such networks.  
The study relies on the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust case, where unacceptable levels 
of service quality, reduced patient well-being, and high mortality rates illustrate how complex 
service networks that comprise many interrelated actors–such as patients/public, employees, 
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managers, and a multiplicity of regulatory bodies–can spawn conflicting tensions resulting in 
imbalance and eventually diminished value outcomes for the network actors (Campbell, 
2013; Holmes, 2013). Building on a thorough analysis of the rich and well-documented Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust case, this paper proposes a framework that explicates how 
imbalance emerges in complex public health service networks. The main contribution of the 
paper is uncovering the origin and drivers of imbalance, and the notion that imbalance is the 
underlying cause of value destruction in complex service networks. These findings contribute 
to a better understanding of value co-creation in complex service networks that has been 
identified as a key research priority by Ostrom et al. (2015). This research makes 
propositions for the conditions under which imbalance leads to value destruction in complex 
service networks, which brings the concept of balanced centricity to an actionable level.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we draw on service-
dominant logic (SDL) and stakeholder theory to outline the conceptual background for value 
co-creation and balanced centricity in complex service networks. This is followed by a 
description of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust case and data analysis. Building on this 
illustrative case, the paper proposes a framework for understanding the origin and drivers of 
imbalance in complex public health service networks and points to how value creation can be 
achieved when appropriate mechanisms are fostered to manage balance. The paper concludes 
by pinpointing important research avenues and practical implications. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Value Co-Creation in Complex Service Networks 
SDL regards all actors, whether businesses or consumers, as resource integrators who interact 
to gain resources for use in their respective value creation processes (Vargo and Lusch, 
2008). These processes involve a range of stakeholders (Gummesson, 2007) who form 
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service networks that provide contexts for value creation (Vargo and Lusch, 2008). Since 
“customers” might play an active role in service creation and delivery processes, and service 
providers also have the role of “beneficiaries” in reciprocal service exchanges, recent 
contributions to SDL move away from pre-designated roles as “customers” and “producers” 
to the more generic notion of “actors” (Vargo and Lusch, 2011).  
More recently SDL explicitly calls for an actor-to-actor orientation to better 
understand value co-creation (Vargo and Lusch, 2016). An actor-to-actor orientation is 
valuable, in that value co-creation often results not from single encounters between two 
actors, but during a customer journey consisting of multiple encounters with different 
touchpoints of a variety of actors (Bitner et al., 2008; Patricio et al., 2011; Teixeira et al., 
2012). McColl-Kennedy et al. (2012), for instance, show that the quality of life of cancer 
patients depends not only on their interactions with doctors and other health professionals 
(market-facing actors), but also on their interactions with family and friends (private actors) 
and support groups (public actors). Similarly, Tax et al. (2013) introduce the concept of 
service delivery networks to capture “two or more entities that, in the eyes of the customers, 
are responsible for the provision of a connected, overall service” (p. 457); however, each 
service provider also interacts with a variety of actors to integrate resources and exchange 
services. Consider, for instance, hospital physicians interacting with a variety of market-
facing and public actors, such as hospital management, local professionals, manufacturers, 
professional regulators, and different public bodies. A multitude of actors–involving people 
and/or organizations–can contribute to creating value for themselves and for other actors and 
jointly provide the context through which value gains its individual and collective assessment 
(Patricio et al., 2011; Pinho et al., 2014; Vargo and Lusch, 2008, 2011). In the context of 
public healthcare, the creation of value increasingly takes place in complex service networks 
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composed of multiple actors for which the degree and nature of the relationship is imperfectly 
known (Pinho et al., 2014; van Riel et al., 2013; Vargo and Lusch, 2016). 
Regarding the nature of the relationships among different actors in a complex health 
service network, several authors hold that these relationships may vary from low to high 
interdependence (Tax et al., 2013; van Riel et al., 2013). Regardless of the level of 
interdependence, however, each dyadic interaction with a network actor is embedded in a 
wide range of interactions with other network actors (Tax et al., 2013). In other words, actors 
and their interactions do not exist in isolation but as part of complex networks (Gummesson, 
2007, 2008; Moller and Halinen, 1999). Moreover, following SDL the actions and 
interactions of different actors are enabled and constrained by institutions defined as 
“humanly devised rules, norms, and beliefs that enable and constrain actions” and 
institutional arrangements defined as “sets of interrelated institutions” (Vargo and Lusch, 
2016). For example, hospital physicians may be influenced by the actions and underlying 
institutions of actors within their network, such as medical schools, hospital management, 
manufacturers, and government, which ultimately has implications for their interactions with 
patients. For instance, medical schools can affect the patient-physician relationship by 
teaching the physicians who perform surgery in the hospital, the hospital management by 
launching initiatives to improve the physician’s operational efficiency, manufacturers by 
developing new surgery packs, and the government by changing reimbursement plans. 
Similarly, the hospital physician-patient relationship may be affected by actions and 
institutions of actors in the patient’s network, as illustrated by recent evidence that frontline 
employees (such as hospital physicians) might perceive interactions among customers (such 
as patients interacting with peers) as job demands (Verleye et al., 2016).   
Value creation for each actor thus depends on their own actions and institutions and 
the actions and institutions of other actors in a complex set of interactions and 
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interdependencies (Pinho et al., 2014). Value co-creation therefore is not necessarily a dyadic 
or sequential process, but takes place in a complex network consisting of different types of 
relationships that indirectly influence value co-creation (Lusch et al., 2010). In sum, it is not 
only the number of actors but also the nature of the relationships among actors that render 
service networks complex (Voss and Hsuan, 2009). 
 
Balanced Centricity in Complex Service Networks 
Since the value co-creation process among actors depends on their own (inter)actions and 
institutions, as well as (inter)actions and institutions in each of the actors’ networks, recent 
advancements in SDL call for adopting a network perspective on value co-creation (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2016). A distinction is noted here between an ego network and a whole network 
perspective: an ego network perspective concentrates on a focal actor (also known as “ego”) 
and the actors with whom the focal actor has a relationship with, referred to as “alters”, and 
all the links among those alters (Everett and Borgatti, 2005; Marsden, 1990). As mentioned, 
focal actors are not only affected by their alters but also by the alters of their alters. 
Therefore, this paper draws upon a complete or whole network perspective, which takes both 
direct and indirect links among different actors in complex service networks into 
consideration (Marsden, 1990). In complex service networks, the actions and institutions of 
one actor can have far-reaching positive and negative consequences for other actors. If the 
government launches a new reimbursement plan for specific types of surgery to support 
patients, for instance, this action might benefit not only patients but also surgeons and 
manufacturers; in contrast, the reimbursement plan might pose a burden on the social security 
system, which has implications for the citizenry, community, and/or nation. As illustrated in 
the example, actions and institutions of one actor might both facilitate and hinder the creation 
of value for other often loosely coupled actors in complex service networks (Frow and Payne, 
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2011; Fry and Polonsky, 2004; Plé and Cáceres, 2010).  
In this context, it is conceivable that actor needs and wants might be in conflict. 
Stakeholder theory holds that the interests of all actors merit consideration for their own sake 
and not merely because of their ability to meet the interests of another group of actors 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In line with this reasoning, the notion of balanced centricity 
highlights a need to consider the interests of multiple actors including the beneficiary within a 
network frame (Gummesson, 2007). Recent research indicates that striving for balanced 
centricity contributes to the effectiveness and performance of organizations and is thus 
instrumental for creating economic advantages over the long-term (Hillebrand et al., 2015).  
Despite these notions, only a handful of researchers have discussed how balanced 
centricity can be achieved. For example, Frow and Payne (2011) propose a five-step process 
to help focal firms move towards a more informed balance across different stakeholders, 
which includes (1) identifying all relevant actors, (2) determining their core values, (3) 
facilitating dialogue and knowledge sharing among different actors, (4) identifying 
opportunities for value co-creation, and (5) co-creating actor value propositions. Quero and 
Ventura (2015) explore the role of quality of information exchanges and actor-to-actor 
relationships to achieve balanced centricity in the creative industry. Hillebrand et al. (2015) 
stress the importance of a stakeholder-orientation, which focuses on “value co-creation in 
network relationships rather than just dyadic relationships and acknowledge the potential of 
indirect creation of value” (p. 412). Hillebrand et al. (2015) hold that complex value 
exchanges in networks require whole-systems thinking defined as “the capability of 
understanding the whole stakeholder value system” (p. 416). To achieve this end, firms need 
to be able to deal with and identify all actors within the system and understand the complex 
structure of that system. Additionally, firms require capabilities to deal with explicit tensions 
between the interests of multiple actors, thereby showing the importance of paradoxical 
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thinking defined as “the degree to which the firm is capable of accepting and learning from 
tensions between stakeholder interests” (p. 419). Finally, firms embedded in complex 
networks with dispersed control require democratic thinking to share control over decision-
making with a multitude of stakeholders (Hillebrand et al., 2015). 
Although highlighting the perspectives of multiple actors, the aforementioned studies 
subscribe to a focal actor or ego network perspective and do not explicitly investigate 
network imbalance. Provan et al. (2007) argue for the adoption of a whole network 
perspective where multilateral ties among multiple actors are taken into consideration, which 
can have important implications for individual network members by avoiding exaggeration of 
the importance of actions and events of individual actors and taking simultaneous and 
collective events and actions into consideration. As a consequence, individual network 
members might also benefit from a whole or complete network perspective, in that a whole or 
complete network perspective does not constrain researchers to focus exclusively on 
individual network members, such as end users.  
 
The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust Case 
The Research Setting: Healthcare and the NHS 
The healthcare setting is particularly complex given the nature of serving ‘reluctant 
consumers’, such that the presence or possibility of illness thrusts people into the healthcare 
service. Serving a customer who arrives with some combination of illness, pain, uncertainty, 
and fear presents a unique challenge. These circumstances can cause medical customers to be 
far more emotional, sensitive, dependent, and/or demanding than they would normally be as 
consumers (Berry et al. 2004, Raghunathan et al., 2006). Moreover, according to Berry and 
Bendapudi (2007) medical customers might be harmed instead of healed by hospital-acquired 
infections and diagnosis and treatment errors, leading to avoidant coping strategies and 
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suboptimal decision-making and behaviours (Duhachek, 2005). In this context, health 
systems typically have several bodies for regulating particular aspects of care such as patient 
safety to safeguard medical customers’ interests, such as the Healthcare Commission and 
Monitor in the NHS. In the meanwhile, health systems experience pressure to reduce cost and 
improve the efficiency of service delivery (World Health Organization, 2016). In the UK, the 
NHS is the world’s fifth largest employer with approximately 1.3 million employees and has 
a total budget (2015-16) of £136.7bn of which £116.6bn is managed by NHS England 
(Campbell and Duncan, 2016). The money for the NHS comes from the Treasury and is 
mostly raised through taxation; approximately half (47%) of the NHS budget is spent on 
acute and emergency care, while general practice, community care, mental health and 
prescribing each account for approximately 10% (NHS England, 2014). Between 2011 and 
2015, the NHS was charged with a £20bn savings drive. In response to these pressures, the 
UK Department of Health, which is responsible for funding health and social care, has 
encouraged all NHS Trusts to reduce fees on external consultancy and make further in-house 
improvements, but 66 NHS Trusts incurred overspend of more than £750m at the end of 
2013-14 (Campbell, 2014). In this sense, all NHS Trusts that manage care in either a 
geographical area and/or a specialized function (NHS, 2016) are confronted with a growing 
need to use all available resources effectively and to provide high-quality medical provision 
at significantly reduced costs. 
 
Case Introduction: the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust  
To gain more insight into the origin and drivers of imbalance in complex service networks 
from a whole network perspective, we analyze the case of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust. 
The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust comprised two hospitals that shared approximately 450 
inpatients with 3000 employees serving a local population of approximately 320,000 
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(Holmes, 2013). Between January 2005 and March 2009, Stafford Hospital, one of the two 
hospitals of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust, experienced shocking levels of dissatisfaction 
and mortality rates (Campbell, 2013). When the levels of performance were uncovered, the 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust and specifically Stafford Hospital was first subjected to a non-
statutory inquiry that focused on the hospital management and staff, but did not consider the 
involvement of the wider system in what went wrong as this was beyond the inquiry’s Terms 
of Reference (Francis, 2013). However, this inquiry recommended a need for further 
investigation of the wider network to consider why these issues had not been detected earlier 
and to ensure that any necessary lessons were learned. The subsequent public inquiry was 
charged to investigate the interactions between the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust and a wide 
variety of agencies with responsibilities for oversight, contracting and regulation of 
healthcare services and professionals at the relevant time and the deficiencies in the system 
which allowed the events specifically at Stafford Hospital to pass unnoticed or without 
effective reaction for so long (Francis, 2013). Consequently, this case is well suited to 
illustrate a situation of imbalance in a complex public health service network where the needs 
and wants of different actors, including the end users, have not been met. Table 1 provides a 
timeline of key events within the case that led to the public inquiry report and its publication, 
along with a list of thematic recommendations derived from the inquiry. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 1 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Data and Analysis 
The case analysis is based upon an extensive independent public inquiry report on the Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust conducted following appalling conditions of care between 2005 and 
2008 (Francis, 2013). The decision to use the public inquiry report for our research relied on 
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the fact that evidence for the causes of the imbalanced situation was gathered from a wide 
variety of witnesses in terms of numbers (cf. 352 individual witness statements) and functions 
(patients and relatives, healthcare professionals, officials, politicians, etc.). Additionally, 
different types of oral and written evidence were included, such as interviews, written 
statements, reports, and regulatory documents. This evidence was extensively described in 
the public inquiry report before discussing the lessons learned from this evidence and key 
recommendations. Taken collectively, these factors contribute to the validity of the public 
inquiry report (Yin, 2014). Next, core participants were informed about the inquiry’s 
intentions and procedural protocols and this information was also shared with the wider 
public and press as they have unfolded rather than after the event, thereby increasing the 
reliability of the public inquiry report. Furthermore, the reliability of the public inquiry report 
was improved by taking live note transcripts of all evidence given, which were first shared 
with the core participants and subsequently with the wider public and press (after 
consultation as necessary). Finally, reports from public inquiries in the UK (including the 
Mid-Staffordshire public inquiry report) have been considered as valuable data sources in 
previous research (Hutchison, 2016). As a consequence, the public inquiry report allows for 
an examination of a case where imbalance was inherent throughout a complex service 
network. 
To improve our understanding of the origin and drivers of imbalance from a whole 
network perspective, a qualitative case-based approach is adopted. The entire contents of the 
report–involving an executive summary (121 pages) and three volumes (1783 pages)–were 
imported in Nvivo. After reading several times through the data to familiarize with the data, 
the data coding began by categorizing units of data into analytical codes, which is a process 
called open coding (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Specifically, the 
open coding process involved capturing each unique idea or thought by means of in vivo 
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codes or codes involving simple descriptive phrases. Next, we compared open codes for 
similarities and differences, thereby identifying more abstract categories. During this process, 
we relied on the concept of balanced centricity and key concepts in SDL and stakeholder 
theory (i.e., actors, actions, rules/norms/beliefs, and interests). In other words, the data were 
analyzed through an iterative process of comparison between theoretical concepts and 
emergent categories, which is in line with Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Yin’s (2014) suggestion 
for developing theory from case study research. By doing so, we identified different aspects 
of imbalance (e.g., “not observing standards of care”) and different types of actors (e.g., 
“local community”), actions (“lack of corrective actions”), norms/rules/beliefs (“wait and see 
attitude”), and interests (“patient care logic”).  
Next, we investigated the relationships among these abstract categories, thereby using 
code matrices in line with the recommendations of Miles and Huberman (1994). Further 
analysis of the code matrices revealed differences and similarities  in terms of interests, rules, 
norms, beliefs, and actions across different actors. As a consequence, we decided to report the 
different interests, norms, rules, and beliefs of different actors as the emergent theme 
“competing institutional logics” and the actions and rules/norms/beliefs across actors as the 
emergent themes “ lack of accountability”, “lack of communication”, “lack of engagement”, 
and “lack of responsiveness” (see Appendix B and C). With regard to the last four themes, 
rules/norms/beliefs and actions were grouped in overarching themes, because the code 
matrices revealed that specific types of actions (e.g., “lack of corrective action”) were highly 
related to specific types of rules/norms/beliefs (e.g., “wait and see attitude”). The imbalance 
that caused the critical situation to emerge in the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust case is found 
through all of these themes, which are now discussed. The origin of imbalance and its drivers 
are then considered in the discussion section. 
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Causes of Imbalance in the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust Case 
 
Our analysis resulted in the identification of five key themes that help explain the emergence 
of imbalance in the studied case: competing institutional logics, lack of accountability, lack 
of information, lack of engagement, and lack of responsiveness. In what follows, each of 
these themes and their link with imbalance is discussed. 
 
Competing Institutional Logics 
Our analysis of the interests, norms, rules, and beliefs–and thus institutional logics–in the 
network revealed clear contradictions between a patient care logic and business logic. The 
former involves a focus on the patient, patient care, patient safety, quality of care, and public 
trust, whereas the latter focuses on financial, organizational, governance issues and achieving 
status and success. A comparison of the institutional logics of different key network actors 
revealed that patient care logic and business logic acted as competing institutional logics, in 
that these logics were held by different network actors. While it is evident that some actors  
within the system, such as nursing staff, did show compassion toward patients (cf. patient 
care logic), the case illustrates that different actors within the system adopted business logic 
at the detriment of a patient care logic. More particularly, there was little support for the 
patient care logic among hospital management (see Quotes 1a and 1b), governmental actors, 
local authorities, non-departmental public bodies (see Quote 1c), and the trust as a whole (see 
Quote 1d). In other words, service provision was compromised as a result of priorities 
pursued and actions executed that were in direct conflict with patient care. The next sections 
elaborate on the reasons for the prevalence of the business logic at the detriment of a patient 
care logic. 
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Quote 1a: “This failure [of the Trust Board] was in part the consequence of allowing a 
focus on reaching national access targets, achieving financial balance and seeking 
foundation trust status to be at the cost of delivering acceptable standards of care.” (p. 
3) 
Quote 1b: “Management thinking [at the Trust] during the period under review was 
dominated by financial pressures and achieving FT status, to the detriment of quality of 
care.” (p. 13)  
Quote 1c: “The Strategic Health Authority’s [SHA] focus was on financial and 
governance issues, as the key criteria valued by the DH and Monitor. However, the SHA 
should not have allowed itself to forget that the purpose of any development in the NHS 
should be to improve the ability of the system to care for its patients.” (p. 50) 
Quote 1d: “The focus of the system resulted in a number of organisations failing to place 
quality of care and patients at the heart of their work. Finances and targets were often 
given priority without considering the impact on the quality of care.” (p. 65) 
 
Lack of Accountability 
Throughout the case there are numerous examples of actors assuming that monitoring, 
performance management and/or intervention was the responsibility of someone else, such 
taken for granted assumptions that others had responsibility in terms of quality of care passed 
accountability from one actor to another with little attempt to collect quality information in a 
systematic way between actors. As illustrated by the example, the case material suggests that 
several actors involved in the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust case experienced 
misunderstandings about their own functions and responsibilities and those of other actors in 
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the NHS (see Quote 2a), and/or did not pay sufficient attention to their specific 
responsibilities (see Quote 2b), leading to overreliance on other actors in the system. In other 
words, actions related to taking responsibilities (cf. overreliance on other actors in the 
system) are driven by rules, norms, and beliefs in terms of responsibilities (cf. 
misunderstanding about responsibilities). A lack of accountability involves thus both rules, 
norms, and beliefs and actions related to (taking) responsibilities.  
Quote 2a: “The role expected of SHAs was challenging (…) There also appears to have 
been a lack of clarity with regard to the extent to which SHAs were expected to address 
concerns about quality and safety.” (p. 49) 
Quote 2b: “I do not think it was the County Committee’s responsibility to go and find out 
what the views of people were. In a sense it would have been pointless to do this given 
the vast and frequently diametrically opposed range of views amongst different members 
of the public” (p. 549) 
Further analysis revealed that this lack of accountability among different actors was found to 
be in part due to norms, rules, beliefs, and actions of actors with regulatory power, as 
illustrated by a lack of clarity on the regulations (see Quote 2c), regulatory gaps in terms of 
responsibilities and accountabilities (see Quote 2d), and constant reorganization of NHS 
structures (see Quote 2e). As a consequence, actors with regulatory power shape actors’ 
norms, rules, beliefs and/or actions related to accountability, thereby leading to a lack of 
accountability at the system level. 
Quote 2c: “It is right to conclude that there had been a lack of clarity in relation to the 
formal allocation of responsibility.” (p. 527) 
Quote 2d: “responsibilities and accountabilities of external agencies were not well 
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defined, often resulting in “regulatory gaps” or failure to follow up warning signs.” (p. 
64) 
Quote 2e: “constant reorganisation of NHS structures, often leading to a loss of 
corporate memory and misunderstandings about an organisation’s functions and 
responsibilities.” (p. 65) 
 
Lack of Communication 
The case evidence suggests that relevant information pertinent to the degree to which 
interests of actors were secured was not properly disseminated and discussed throughout the 
system, because a multitude of actors in the system gave insufficient consideration to the 
importance of information sharing and communication (see Quote 3a and 3b). At the heart of 
these communication failures were a false belief among different actors in the system that 
others would keep them informed rather than actively seeking and communicating 
information independently (see Quote 3c). This evidence suggests that norms, rules, and 
beliefs in relation to communication (cf. low importance of and false beliefs in terms of 
information sharing) lead to communication-related actions (cf. not properly disseminating 
information and waiting for information rather than actively seeking information).  
Quote 3a: “A failure of communication between the many agencies to share their 
knowledge of concerns.” (p. 49) 
Quote 3b: There was insufficient consideration given to the importance of 
communication with regulatory and supervisory bodies in order to ensure that relevant 
information pertinent to patient safety was properly disseminated, discussed and 
appropriate action considered.” (p. 60) 
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Quote 3c: “There was, however, an unhealthy attitude of leaving it up to Monitor to find 
what they were looking for, rather than the Trust openly and proactively seeking out 
information about the problems of which Monitor needed to be aware.” (p. 393) 
Not only were issues surrounding communication-related actions present at the level of the 
whole system, it was endemic between all actors, for example, small, volunteer groups 
representing the public voice did not have the means or the authority to provide an effective 
channel of communication through which other types of actors in the healthcare system could 
benefit from the enormous resource of patient and public experience waiting to be exploited. 
Similar issues were also present among similar types of actors, such as members of the same 
organization (see Quote 3d) or similar types of organizations that failed to connect pieces of 
information that would have shown the full consequences of action/inaction (see Quote 3e). 
As illustrated by these examples, issues surrounding communication-related actions among a 
multitude of actors at all levels of the system led to an inadequate understanding of the degree 
to which patients’ interests were secured at the system level. 
Quote 3d: “The surgeons worked independently of one another; there was little 
communication between them” (p. 121) 
Quote 3e: “Communication of intelligence between regulators needs to go further than 
sharing existing concerns identified as risks, and it should extend to all intelligence 
which when pieced together with that possessed by partner organisations may raise the 
level of concern.” (p. 56) 
  
Lack of Engagement 
The data revealed that business performance was given priority without considering the 
impact on the quality of care due to high levels of disengagement throughout the system, with 
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the case reporting that there was insufficient sense of engagement for ensuring quality care 
and thus engagement with the patients and the public (see Quote 4a) and a general lack of 
effective engagement with patients and the public (see Quote 4b). In other words, the lack of 
engagement among a wide variety of actors reflects both norms, rules, and beliefs (cf. 
insufficient sense of collective engagement in Quote 4a) and actions (cf. doing little to reach 
out to the public in Quote 4b).  
Quote 4a: “The Trust lacked a sufficient sense of collective responsibility or engagement 
for ensuring that quality care was delivered at every level.” (p. 65) 
Quote 4b: “The forum did little to reach out to the public to obtain wider views. There 
was a lack of effective engagement with the public.” (p. 504) 
Further analysis reveals that a lack of engagement actions towards patients and the public 
depends on actors’ beliefs about the appreciation for engagement with patients and the public 
by other actors and the consequences of engagement with patients and the public for 
themselves (see Quote 4c). In other words, actors’ engagement actions are driven by their 
engagement beliefs, which in turn depend on other actors’ engagement actions and beliefs. 
Additionally, there is some evidence that actors’ engagement with patients and the public 
might also depend on the degree to which they experience engagement from other actors 
towards them (see Quote 4d and 4e).  In sum, a complex tangle of disengagement among a 
wide variety of actors ultimately led to a lack of engagement with the patients and the public. 
Quote 4c: “clinicians did not vigorously pursue with management concerns they may 
have had. The reason for this was in part a perception that the raising of concerns was 
not welcome by senior management, and in part the very human reluctance to risk job 
security and potential opprobrium.” (p. 174) 
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Quote 4d: “the management was a very inwards facing organisation, with a poor or 
defensive engagement with external bodies, including the HCC [Healthcare 
Commission]” (p. 171) 
Quote 4e: “Generic standards were formulated not by the regulator but by the 
Government, thereby inhibiting the engagement with the standards of those working in 
the system (…) This must have contributed to the impression that the process was 
government controlled and thereby reinforced the disengagement of frontline 
clinicians.” (p. 54) 
 
Lack of Responsiveness 
There is clear evidence to suggest that problems were highlighted and raised from a number 
of actors including agencies, staff, clinicians, public, and patients,  yet the case demonstrates 
a lack of urgency among actors to address and respond to concerns raised (see Quote 5a). The 
inaction of actors that might have responded to such concerns and the lack of corrective 
actions appear to be associated with a culture of (1) false assurance, (2) ignorance or 
avoidance, (3) underestimation of risks and concerns, and (4) waiting and seeing (see Quote 
5b). In other words, a lack of responsiveness is reflected in both the norms, rules, and beliefs 
(cf. culture of ignorance and avoidance) and actions (cf. lack of corrective action). Moreover, 
this lack of responsiveness was found between actors at multiple levels across the system, 
such as hospital management (see Quote 5c), local GPs (see Quote 5d), strategic health 
authorities (see Quote 5e), resulting in a lack of responsiveness at the level of the NHS 
system. 
Quote 5a: “There is no evidence that she was then required by those higher up in the 
system to take any further action, or that anything else was done until the information 
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was used to inform the core standards risk-based assessment the following year” (p. 
860) 
Quote 5b: “there was a need, in the interests of patients, for joint action by all those in a 
position to take it. While some steps were taken, the impression given has been one of 
waiting to see the outcome of the investigation rather than to accept that there was a 
current fundamental crisis giving rise to risks to patient care. 
Quote 5c: “There was an unacceptable delay in addressing the issue of shortage of 
skilled nursing staff. There can be little doubt that the reason for the slow progress in the 
review, and the slowness of the Board to inject the necessary funds and a sense of real 
urgency into the process, was the priority given to ensuring that the Trust books were in 
order for the FT application.” (p. 45) 
Quote 5d: “local GPs only expressed substantive concern about the quality of care at the 
Trust after the announcement of the HCC investigation, when it had become obvious 
there were issues and when they were specifically asked.” (p. 47) 
Quote 5e: “concerns were raised by external reviews, indicating the possibility of 
serious deficiencies affecting the safety of patients and the quality of care they received. 
These were known to SaSSHA, but there was no sense of urgency in ensuring that they 
had been addressed effectively.” (p. 736). 
 
Discussion 
SDL holds that actors in complex networks are driven by their respective goals and interests 
enabled and constrained by institutional logics, which involve institutional rules, norms, and 
beliefs and sets of interrelated institutions (Vargo and Lusch, 2016). In the Mid-Staffordshire 
22 
case, patient care and business logic act as competing institutional logics within the network, 
in that these logics reflect divergent and even conflicting rules, norms, beliefs, and interests. 
This finding is in line with the view that public health service networks incorporate elements 
from different institutional logics that are not always compatible (Pache and Santos, 2013). 
Moreover, Vargo and Lusch (2016) confirm that institutional logics cannot only intersect and 
overlap but also create conflicting views on value. Based on the case analysis it is posited that 
competing institutional logics are the origin of imbalance in the studied complex network, 
where the legitimate interests of patients and the public are not secured. However, it is the 
way in which different actors in complex service networks deal with competing institutional 
logics that explains imbalances, rather than competing logics alone. In other words, 
imbalance can only occur if complex service networks are characterized by competing 
institutional logics, but competing institutional logics do not necessarily lead to imbalance. 
Therefore, we propose that competing institutional logics are the origin and not the driver of 
imbalance: 
P1: Competing institutional logics are the origin of imbalance in complex service 
networks. 
We argue that complex service networks characterized by competing institutional logics, as 
exemplified by the Mid-Staffordshire case, inevitably make achieving a perfect balance 
impossible, as the needs and wants of diverse actors cannot be fully prioritized at the same 
time. In the meanwhile, it is important to note that imbalance is not inherently good or bad, 
for example, at low to moderate degrees of imbalance complex service networks may not 
secure legitimate interests but still perform well and create value. Optimal value creation in 
networks charactized by competing institutional logics is achieved when the needs, wants, 
and interests of each actor are secured to a reasonable degree. The case evidence, however, 
23 
suggests that different actors within the system adopted business logic at the detriment of 
patient care logic. In this situation, the needs, wants, and interests of patients and the public 
are not at all secured (high degrees of imbalance), leading to value deteroriation and even 
destruction as reflected in shocking levels of patient dissatisfaction and mortality rates. 
Building on this evidence, our second proposition contends: 
P2: In complex service networks, there is a threshold level of imbalance beyond 
which value creation (economic or quality) will deteriorate and taken to the 
extreme complete destruction of any value will occur. 
Interestingly, the Mid-Staffordshire case also provides insight into the conditions under 
which competing institutional logics exceed the threshold level of imbalance beyond which 
value deterioriation and destruction occur. Specifically, the findings point to four moderating 
factors that drive the degree to which competing institutional logics can generate imbalance 
in the network to the extent that value deterioriation and destruction occur. As mentioned in 
the findings section, in line with SDL each of these factors reflect actions and institutional 
logics in the form of rules, norms, and beliefs that enable and constrain balance. As a 
consequence, these findings support the view that actions and institutions of one actor might 
both facilitate and hinder the creation of value for other often loosely coupled actors in 
complex service networks (Frow and Payne, 2011; Fry and Polonsky, 2004; Plé and Cáceres, 
2010). The case evidence, however, suggests that the impact of actions and institutions of one 
actor are intensified by similar actions and institutions of other actors. Indeed, extant research 
suggests that a multitude of actors in complex service network jointly provide the context 
through which value gains its individual and collective assessment (Patricio et al., 2011; 
Pinho et al., 2014; Vargo and Lusch, 2008, 2011). If multiple actors show similar actions and 
institutions, these actors cumulatively contribute to making actions and institutions desirable, 
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proper, or appropriate–a process labeled as institutionalization–throughout the  service 
network (Suchman 1995). Vargo and Lusch (2016) confirm that service networks constrain 
and coordinate themselves through institutional logics at various levels of aggregation. By 
showing that institutional logics and actions related to accountability, communication, 
engagement, and responsiveness moderate the impact of competing institutional logics on 
imbalance in the studied service network, the case evidence also provides insight into the 
concretization of actions and institutional logics that facilitate and/or hinder value creation. 
First, it is posited that the prevalence of these moderating factors in the network will 
determine the degree of imbalance generated by competing institutional logics. The case 
illustrates that as these moderating factors deplete, competing institutional logics will likely 
generate imbalance in the network to a greater degree. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
P3: Low levels of accountability, communication, engagement, and 
responsiveness within the network will intensify the degree to which competing 
institutional logics increase imbalance in complex service network. 
While the case study analysis uncovers the drivers of imbalance in a public health service 
network, conversely it seems plausible that when prevalent in the network these factors will 
serve to foster balance. In other words, it is postulated that the presence of appropriate levels 
of accountability, communication, engagement, and responsiveness will mitigate the 
generation of imbalance from competing institutional logics. This assumption finds support in 
previous literature that indicates that the presence of clear role division (cf. accountability), 
and dialogue and knowledge sharing (cf. communication) advances the functioning of a 
service network (e.g., Frow and Payne 2011, Hakanen and Jaakkola, 2012, Hillebrand et al. 
2015). In sum, the following is proposed:  
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P4: Appropriate levels of accountability, communication, engagement, and 
responsiveness within the network will mitigate the degree to which competing 
institutional logics increase imbalance in a complex service network. 
Figure 1 draws together these propositions and illustrates that balance in public health service 
networks is a dynamic phenomenon. The origin of imbalance is found in competing 
institutional logics. In the context of public health service networks, business logic competes 
with patient care logic. If either dominates beyond a certain threshold point, either quality of 
care or economic performance deteriorates and becomes unsustainable (see Figure 1). It is 
suggested that value co-creation for all actors (i.e., balanced centricity) is achievable in 
complex service networks when competing institutional logics are effectively managed and 
balanced. This balancing act is a dynamic phenomenon of constant iteration between network 
actors, facilitated or hindered by the levels of accountability, communication, engagement 
and responsiveness within the service network.   
------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Research Implications 
Theoretical Contributions  
This study explored the origin and drivers of imbalance in a public health service network, a 
context that is of great importance both in terms of citizens’ wellbeing as well as public 
spending, but at the same time complex and evidently prone to disturbances. The point of 
departure for the study was the concept of balanced centricity (Gummesson, 2007, 2008) that 
urges organizations to consider the interests of all actors in their network, a view closely 
aligned with stakeholder theory (e.g., Hillebrand et al., 2015; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
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The balanced centricity concept draws attention to the notion that each actor in a service 
network is driven by their respective needs, wants and goals, and a failure to take different 
aspirations into account will result in imbalance particularly in complex networks. Inspired 
by this concept, this paper analyzed the well-documented case of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Trust to identify root causes of a health service network dysfunction that resulted in 
diminished patient care quality.  
This study finds that the primary underlying origin of network imbalance is the 
competing institutional logics of those actors in the network. In other words, complex service 
networks are characterized by the inherent existence of multiple parallel institutional 
arrangements (Vargo and Lusch, 2016), but the degree to which different institutional 
arrangements compete with one another involves risk of an imbalanced situation. The degree 
to which imbalance exceeds the threshold level beyond which value deterioriation and 
destruction occur, however, depends on how different actors in complex service networks 
deal with these competing institutional logics. Specifically, this research suggests that 
complex service networks characterized by competing institutional logics can achieve 
optimal value creation when a balance is found between divergent competing logics. The 
study further identifies four key factors (accountability, communication, engagement, and 
responsiveness) that are proposed to moderate the propensity of imbalance generated by 
competing institutional logics. In sum, competing logics alone do not determine imbalance, 
but rather but the way in which different actors in complex service networks deal with these 
competing logics explain imbalance and network dysfunction. 
These findings contribute to previous research in several streams. First, our findings 
contribute to the area of service networks. Previous research has provided insight on how 
value co-creation occurs in the interaction between actors in complex service networks (e.g., 
Pinho et al., 2014; Frow and Payne, 2011; Vargo and Lusch, 2016) and how multi-actor 
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service networks should be designed to create smooth customer journeys through the system 
(e.g., Patricio et al., 2008; Patricio et al., 2011; Tax et al., 2013). This study adds to previous 
research by highlighting the dark side of multi-actor service networks and pinpointing 
potential sources of hindrances to value co-creation and superior customer experiences.   
Specifically, this paper identifies imbalance as the underlying cause of network 
dysfunction. As a consequence, this paper elaborates on the concept of balanced centricity 
which was originally presented as a potentially utopian one (Gummesson, 2008), but has 
remained sparsely studied. This paper brings this concept to an actionable (realistic) level and 
discusses to what extent this concept is viable and what factors hinder or enable it. Previous 
research suggests that network actors can adopt different strategies to deal with competing 
interests or logics. Pache and Santos (2013) make a distinction between symbolically 
supporting one logic while implementing another logic (decoupling) and crafting a balance 
between competing logics (compromising). Conceptually, Hillebrand et al. (2015) seem to 
support the compromising strategy by stating that understanding the whole network and 
learning from competing interests of the network actors is preferable to ignoring or 
suppressing competing interests. The case evidence supports this reasoning by demonstrating 
the disastrous implications of neglecting the causes of imbalance in the network. Moreover, 
this paper offers insight into how balance between competing logics may be crafted in a 
complex service network by fostering accountability, communication, engagement, and 
responsiveness in the network. 
By providing insight into the importance of and mechanisms by which balanced 
centricity may be realized, this study highlights a dynamic, interactive and iterative approach 
to stakeholder theory. Stakeholders themselves are interrelated in networks, thus addressing 
the needs of only one specific stakeholder group within a network may subsequently impact 
relationships with other stakeholders in the network. As a consequence, there is a need to 
28 
reflect the multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set. The study findings develop 
understanding into the role of conflicting logics. While accommodating the diverse and 
divergent needs of an entire stakeholder set is challenging, this balancing act can be fostered 
by the four identified factors that are critical for minimizing imbalance in service networks. 
 
Avenues for Future Research 
There are many opportunities for future research in line with the present study. For example it 
is possible to look upon the limitations of the present study and pinpoint the need for a 
different methodological departure. This study relies on secondary data drawn from a public 
inquiry report. Although the purpose of the public inquiry was in line with the research 
purpose (i.e., understanding why the interests of patients were not taken into consideration) 
and it is a strength that these data are not created as a result of our case study (Yin 2014), we 
had no control over sampling and data collection methods. In the first-stage of investigation 
the inquiry focused on origins and drivers of below expected service standards among 
hospital staff and management. The inquiry, however, revealed that the wider network also 
played an important role, leading to a focus on the wider system in a second stage of 
investigation. The two-stage approach suggests that the public inquiry was open to address 
shortcomings of the sampling and data collection method.  
Moreover, the public inquiry may be charged with ‘pointing the finger’ after the fact. 
This bias, however, cannot be avoided, in that we can only rely on retrospective data to study 
the Mid-Staffordshire case. However, the selection of a case to gather prospective data is 
difficult due to uncertainty about cases in which imbalance may occur. Based upon our 
research findings in relation to the origins and drivers of imbalance, future research might 
select multiple cases to gather both prospective and retrospective data to gain more insight 
into the issues related to balanced centricity.  
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Furthermore, the report primarily focused on the negative outcomes of imbalance for 
one group of actors in particular, the patients, and while this has provided insights related to 
the causes of imbalance originating from all actors in the network, it would have been fruitful 
to more thoroughly look into the other actors experiences during the same period. 
Unfortunately, this was beyond the scope of the secondary data drawn upon. One conclusion 
is that empirical investigation of balanced centricity would require a rather sophisticated 
methodology to fully understand the imbalanced situation for all actors, given the complexity 
of such service networks. This is an open avenue for future research.  
A related topic is the dynamics of balancing interests. If we move away from the 
dyadic relationship of “customers” and “producers” and claim that different actor needs 
require different outcomes, there is a call for future studies exploring service networks that 
might reveal different actors’ rationale. Many questions remain unanswered, for example, 
does a high level of diversity among actors create a higher prevalence of competing 
institutional logics? What about the interplay of institutional logics specifically on different 
actors? Each actor may be affected by multiple logics, e.g. a doctor as a member of the 
medical profession but also as an administrator may be torn between two logics, and so there 
is a need to further investigate the notion of competing institutional logics as this may be 
more complex in itself. It is also important to study how service networks could be managed 
to better develop and maintain balance, for example can individual actors take the role of 
seeking balance by mediating between relevant actors? And what management activities are 
relevant in those cases? While we shed light on these issues by uncovering appropriate 
mechanisms that when fostered can be used to manage balance between divergent logics 
(e.g., accountability, communication, engagement, and responsiveness), the implementation 
of these mechanisms in practice warrants exploration. 
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Practical Contributions 
The present study has both administrative and policy implications. First, from an 
administrative perspective the importance of acknowledging competing institutional logics 
cannot be downplayed and must be taken into account when designing management and 
measurement systems. While individual members in organizations tend to do what is “locally 
reasonable”, the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust case shows how a network in imbalance can 
lead to disastrous service outcomes. The paper gives some direction for how to keep 
networks in balance and to prevent the narrow concern of actors that may undermine balance 
in a complex service network. Development work in areas like communication, 
accountability, engagement and responsiveness seems well invested.  
Second, at the broader policy level, with decreasing budgets and resource depletion 
continuing into the future, identifying how to do more with less becomes ever necessary for 
public services. While balancing conflicting institutional logics and their associated 
competing goals is inherently difficult within complex public health service networks, 
pinpointing conditions that may serve to catalyze imbalance (e.g., accountability, 
communication, engagement, and responsiveness at low levels) but also serve to manage 
balance (e.g., accountability, communication, engagement, and responsiveness at high levels) 
offers critical insight into how policy may be able to shape balanced centricity. It is these 
specific factors that must be collectively pursued and therefore mandated by policy to ensure 
that they are not neglected since competing institutional logics are present in all public health 
service networks and by implication, the potential for imbalance (and the associated negative 
consequences) is present in all such service networks. 
 
Conclusion 
Public service networks are inherently complex as they comprise of many interrelated actors 
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of which most are driven by divergent interests. Drawing on the balanced centricity 
perspective, this paper explores the causes of imbalance in a public health service network. 
Adopting the theoretical lenses of SDL and stakeholder theory, the origin of imbalance is 
found to stem from competing institutional logics of various actors (patients/public, 
employees, managers, and a multiplicity of regulatory bodies), but the degree to which these 
competing institutional logics lead to imbalance is moderated by accountability, 
communication, engagement, and responsiveness within the service network. In other words, 
it is the way in which different actors in complex service networks (mis)manage competing 
institutional logics that can explains imbalance, not competing logics in themselves. By 
examining imbalance as the underlying cause of network dysfunction, this research also 
contributes to understanding of the dynamics in, and performance of, complex service 
networks. While the existence of multiple parallel institutional arrangements makes networks 
inherently imbalanced, value creation can be achieved when the appropriate mechanisms–
including accountability, communication, engagement, and responsiveness–are fostered to 
better manage balance between divergent logics. 
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